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Abstract This paper presents a feasibility study to
protect smart card software against fault-injection at-
tacks by means of link-time code rewriting. This ap-
proach avoids the drawbacks of source code hardening,
avoids the need for manual assembly writing, and is ap-
plicable in conjunction with closed third-party compil-
ers. We implemented a range of cookbook code harden-
ing recipes in a prototype link-time rewriter and evalu-
ate their coverage and associated overhead to conclude
that this approach is promising. We demonstrate that
the overhead of using an automated link-time approach
is not significantly higher than what can be obtained
with compile-time hardening or with manual harden-
ing of compiler-generated assembly code.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic keys and PIN hashes are often embed-
ded in programmable hardware such as smart cards. To
steal that data, attackers apply sophisticated attacks.
During passive attacks, attackers observe the behav-
ior of the chip executing code to reconstruct the pro-
gram structure and obtain knowledge on its internal
data values. The observable behavior includes timing,
power consumption [36], electromagnetic radiation, etc.
In active attacks, which often build on passive attacks,
attackers intervene in the execution by injecting faults
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by means of power glitches, clock period alterations,
temperature rises, active probing of buses, or light at-
tacks [8]. Faults cause bit flips that can alter data val-
ues or program code, e.g., when an instruction being
fetched is altered by a laser flash. When this remains
undetected, security barriers risk being broken: private
keys can leak when both correct and incorrect outputs
are available [6]; private data can get exported because
array bounds checks are corrupted [8]; skipping encryp-
tion rounds can leak keys [13]; and checks to prevent the
output of invalid data can get circumvented [25].
To protect the software, hardware can provide re-
dundancy, e.g., by using error-correcting coding [23],
or redundancy can be inserted in the software to de-
tect occurring faults [46]. The latter approach typically
offers more flexibility with respect to the security poli-
cies that can be deployed in the field. To exploit the
flexibility maximally, some fully automated compiler or
code generation tool ideally can apply generic forms of
low-overhead redundancy to implement security poli-
cies specified in a convenient form, i.e., without imped-
ing the programmer’s productivity.
This implies that programmers should not have to
waste effort and time on changing their source code
to introduce the redundancy, nor should they have to
rewrite or even inspect the compiler-generated assembly
code. Instead they should have to care only about the
functional correctness of their source code.
Many redundancy schemes have been proposed to
protect against single-event upsets (i.e, soft errors) [2,
7,41–43,39], to protect against targeted attacks [44,
24], and to prevent control flow from deviating from
predetermined paths [1]. Automated support for these
schemes, that also tries to limit the performance over-
head of the introduced redundancy, is typically imple-
mented in (research) compilers.
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In practice, however, companies rely on multiple
in-house and third-party development tool chains that
may change over time. To maintain interoperability with
different tool chains and avoid vendor lock-in, tools that
automate the implementation of security policies should
therefore be separate tools that do not break existing
tool chains and do not depend on the internal opera-
tion of the used compilers. This leaves two basic options
to insert redundancy: source code rewriting and (post-)
link-time binary code rewriting.
This paper presents a feasibility study of link-time
binary code rewriting to protect against fault-injection
attacks, assessing its impact on efficiency and effective-
ness. The paper’s contribution is its argumentation as
to why link-time code rewriting is feasible with closed,
third-party compiler tool flows, as well as an evaluation
of the coverage and overhead obtained with a proto-
type link-time rewriter that implements four standard
protections. Concretely, our experiments demonstrate
that the overhead of this approach is not unaccept-
ably higher than what could be achieved with other
approaches, such as compile-time protection or manual
assembly code protection.
We evaluate four cookbook recipes for local harden-
ing of code against certain classes of single-instruction
failures, i.e., single instructions that are skipped as the
result of an injected fault [37]. With these protections,
we target the ARM Cortex-M0, the core used in ARM
smart card SecurCore SC000 processors [52].
We know of no automated fault-injection protection
tools in use today for smart card software. The result-
ing need to provide this protection manually is one of
the main reasons why assembly programming is still so
common in this domain. By providing convincing argu-
ments for automating this protection in a tool that does
not disrupt proprietary compiler tool flows and that in-
troduces only a minimal amount of additional overhead,
we hope to contribute a significant step towards more
productive smart card programming.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the alternative approaches of source-to-source
rewriting, link-time rewriting and post-link-time rewrit-
ing. Section 3 presents the protections we implemented
in a prototype, and discusses how to measure the over-
head resulting from the link-time implementation rather
than from the protections themselves. This overhead is
evaluated in Section 4. Section 5 gives an overview of
related work. Finally, Section 6 draws conclusions.
2 Compatibility with Third-Party Compilers
This section discusses the potential of source-to-source,
link-time and post-link-time code rewriting in the sce-
nario where security experts have to protect software
that is to be compiled with third-party compilers. More
specifically, the goal of the security experts is to trans-
form the code such that it implements sufficient protec-
tion at minimal overhead.
2.1 Source-to-source rewriting
Source-to-source rewriters, be it tools or programmers,
insert redundancy before the code is compiled. They
do so by duplicating source code statements. In our
eyes, source-to-source rewriters suffer from a number of
major drawbacks in the targeted scenario.
First, optimizing compilers risk undoing the protec-
tion by eliminating the inserted redundancy, e.g., by
means of common subexpression elimination [38]. To
avoid this, i.e., to ensure that sufficient redundancy
survives the compiler and remains present in the gener-
ated code, the source-to-source rewriter can either in-
sert code that is not analyzed and optimized by the
compiler, as is typically the case with inline assembly
code, or he can insert code that is complex enough to
withstand being identified as redundant by the com-
piler’s analyses. For ensuring sufficient redundancy, both
options work fine.
It remains a problem, however, how to ensure the
presence of only the necessary redundancy, i.e., suffi-
cient redundancy with minimal overhead. Based on our
experience with several open source and proprietary
compilers, we do not consider this feasible. Fundamen-
tally, it is very hard, and most often simply not possible,
to insert redundant code in the source that is not elim-
inated by the compiler, but that at the same time does
not limit the precision or scope of the compiler’s exist-
ing analyses and optimizations to reduce the code size
or the execution time of the remaining code. Even if a
kind of code complexity sweet spot existed where both
properties hold, this sweet spot would be very depen-
dent on the specific compiler and implemented protec-
tion. As a result, neither the protection nor the minimal
overhead introduced by the source code rewriter would
be portable. This implies that the source code rewriter,
in case it is an automated tool, would have to be re-
tuned, retrained or ported to each different combination
of compilers and target architecture used. In case the
rewriting happens manually, it means the manual effort
would have to be reinvested every time a new compiler
or target architecture is used. Moreover, it would also
require the security expert to be a compiler expert. Cer-
tainly, that is not ideal.
Fundamentally, the sketched problem is an instance
of a more generic problem of source-to-source rewrit-
ers: as security concerns many abstraction layers, incl.
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physics, computer architecture, binary code and proto-
cols, many security policies involve lower-level aspects
that are hard to control in source code when the used
compilers are black boxes. In the above instance, the
problem is to specify which redundancy should survive
the compiler and which complexity should not.
Furthermore, as source code rewriters are language-
dependent, they need to be redeveloped for every lan-
guage. Finally, white-box and black-box security test-
ing typically takes place on the final binary code. Even
though techniques have been developed to bridge the
gap, communication between testing teams and protec-
tion tool developers is harder if the former are study-
ing assembly code generated by one or more black-box
compilers, while the latter are working on source code.
2.2 Link-time Binary Rewriting
Binary code rewriters or assembly rewriters that are
applied to compiled or manually written assembly code
do not suffer from the above problems. They do suffer,
however, from the fact that they have to operate on
code that lacks high-level, abstract semantic informa-
tion, such as symbol and type information. This lack of
information limits the precision and scope of many pro-
gram analyses and transformations, and can hence have
a negative impact on the provided level of protection as
well as the incurred overhead.
From a security perspective, we first have to con-
sider whether it is possible, with link-time rewriting
tools, to reliably obtain sufficient protection on code
generated with third-party compilers.
We conjecture that this is indeed possible. Regard-
ing the wide range of transformations that can be ap-
plied at link-time, as necessary to insert the necessary
redundancy, we point to the existing applications of
the open-source link-time binary rewriting framework
Diablo1 [48]. These applications include optimization
and compaction [19], obfuscation [4,34] and deobfusca-
tion [32], anti-tampering [51], formal verification of bi-
nary code [54], instrumentation [16], GUI binary code
editing [49], and operating system customization [12].
Diablo’s potential for reliably transforming code gen-
erated with third-party tool flows and targeting differ-
ent processor architectures is obvious given that Dia-
blo has been applied to software written in different
languages, incl. C, C++, assembly and Fortran; bi-
nary code generated with different compiler generations
covering more than a decade of proprietary as well as
open-source compilers (incl. ARM ADS, ARM RVCT,
and gcc) [19]; system libraries that contain significant
1 http://diablo.elis.ugent.be
amounts of manually-written assembly, incl. newlibc2,
glibc3, and uClibc4 [19]; a range of architectures, incl.
SH [14], PowerPC [10], MIPS [33], IA64 [5], x86 [12],
and ARM incl. Thumb [12,19]; the Linux kernel [12,
11], which features artifacts such as mixed code for
physical and virtual address spaces, privileged instruc-
tions, manually written assembly not adhering to the
conventions as specified in application binary interfaces
(ABIs), and a complicated, non-standard build process.
Despite these existing demonstrations of Diablo’s
flexibility and reliability, it is not clear a priori that a
tool like Diablo can deliver acceptable protection against
fault-injection at acceptable overhead, with an accept-
able engineering effort. The reason is that all tools de-
veloped on top of Diablo have been designed to de-
pend solely on information that is generally available in
object files, such as symbol information, relocation in-
formation, and optionally debug information [30]. This
enables them to handle code generated by open-source
compilers as well as closed compilers, but it also limits
the capabilities of link-time rewriters.
First, the link-time rewriters lack high-level seman-
tic information about the code to be rewritten. For ex-
ample, no type information is available, which makes
alias analysis much less precise [20,38]. Consequently,
link-time rewriters typically need to handle memory
as a black box. For example, after reading in a pro-
gram’s object files that are normally linked with a stan-
dard linker, Diablo disassembles the code and builds
a whole-program, interprocedural control flow graph
(CFG) [38]. The nodes in this graph are basic blocks,
i.e., single-entry single-exit sequences of instruction, in
which instructions are represented using a very low-
level, assembly-like intermediate representation (IR) [15,
38]. These instructions operate on type-less architec-
tural registers that cannot be aliased because pointers
to registers to not exist. With the exception of memory
accesses at constant addresses and direct stack accesses,
all loads and stores are handled as if they access one big
memory array at unknown locations.
This is a big contrast with compilers, which per-
form part of their analyses and optimizations on code
that operates on typed variables and objects. Only af-
ter the compiler has performed the high-level optimiza-
tions, the variables are assigned to registers or, when
not enough registers are available at some point, they
are spilled to memory. This register allocation can be
optimized globally in a compiler [38].
Link-time rewriters do not have this optimization
potential. When they rewrite and duplicate code, they
2 http://sourceware.org/newlib/
3 http://www.gnu.org/software/libc/
4 http://www.uclibc.org/
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will have to find free registers to store temporary val-
ues. In case they cannot find them, because the compiler
has used all available registers for the original code, the
link-time rewriter has to free registers by temporarily
spilling values to the stack. Applying this spilling locally
on a low-level IR with register operands potentially in-
troduces considerably more overhead than what can be
achieved in a compiler.
Secondly, at link time indirect control flow transfers,
of which binary code analysis cannot resolve the tar-
gets precisely, have to be modeled conservatively (i.e.,
over-approximated) on the basis of relocation informa-
tion [15,17]. Through additional edges in the CFG that
model that over-approximation, the CFG models a su-
perset of all possible executions of a program. This is
safe, but leads to a loss in analysis precision for inter-
procedural analyses like context-sensitive liveness anal-
ysis, conditional constant propagation, copy propaga-
tion, and reachability analysis, on the basis of which
tools like Diablo apply optimizations such as unreach-
able and dead code elimination, constant folding, inlin-
ing, etc. [38]. For a more detailed discussion, we refer
to the existing literature [15,17,19,48].
Over the last decade, several techniques and tools
have been proposed to improve the precision and scope
of automated analyses of binary code, e.g., to retrieve
targets of indirect control flow transfers [26] and to re-
cover type information [21]. Moreover, advanced tools
such as TSL (Transformer Specification Language) for
automatically generating analyses based on abstract
interpretation facilitate the engineering of new analy-
ses [31]. Still, because of (1) the wide range of transfor-
mations and optimizations that compilers apply, includ-
ing in some cases obfuscating transformations, because
of (2) the undecidability of many compiler analyses, and
because of (3) the limitations one needs to impose on
the resources and time available to analyze programs,
there will necessarily always be limitations on the pre-
cision and scope of automated analyses.
It is mainly because of these limitations that it is
necessary to evaluate the extra overhead introduced by
applying hardening transformations at link time, i.e.,
the overhead that could be avoided by instead applying
the same transformations in source code, in a compiler,
or by manually rewriting assembly code.
2.3 Post Link-time Binary Rewriting
O’Sullivan et al. recently proposed an interesting alter-
native for link-time rewriting [40]. Their SecondWrite
tool rewrites a binary executable lacking relocation in-
formation post link time. The executable is first dis-
assembled into the IR (intermediate representation) of
LLVM5 [29], then rewritten and optimized, before be-
ing scheduled and register-allocated into a new binary.
This offers many of the benefits of link-time rewriting,
and in addition end users can rewrite any untrusted
third-party software binaries, even when the binaries
lack any kind of symbol or debug information. Further-
more, working with a more abstract compiler IR allows
SecondWrite to alter stack frame layouts globally and
to apply all existing optimizations in LLVM for free. At
least in theory, SecondWrite hence supports more elab-
orate protection schemes. Furthermore, a more global
register allocation can be performed on the LLVM IR,
which potentially reduces the overhead of applied fault-
injection protections.
However, SecondWrite’s approach also comes with
some major disadvantages. Its main disadvantages re-
late to the need to maintain conservativeness in the
absence of relocation information [45]. To ensure that
operations involving computed addresses (e.g., indirect
branches, function pointers and memory accesses through
pointers) are rewritten correctly, SecondWrite does not
relocate any statically allocated data. The read-only
data embedded in the original code section (e.g., ad-
dress or constant pools) are not relocated either, and
remain located at their original addresses. Furthermore,
before indirect control flow transfers, SecondWrite in-
serts translation table lookups to translate addresses
from the original binary to addresses in the new binary
at run time, such that the transfers are redirected cor-
rectly even if their targets could not be resolved stati-
cally.6 In addition, whenever SecondWrite cannot prove
that some bytes embedded in the code section are actu-
ally data, it conservatively handles these bytes as both
code and as data. To that extent, SecondWrite leaves
a copy of the bytes in their original location to sup-
port all potential data accesses to the bytes, and adds
a rewritten copy of the bytes interpreted as code to the
program IR. So in the address space of the rewritten
binary, the statically allocated data sections remain in
place, as do the (potential) data pools from the origi-
nal code section. Some data is duplicated as code and
in addition translation tables and lookups are added.
This all results in considerable code size and file size
overhead, even before any protection is applied.
Other post link time rewriters like REINS [50] and
the tool by Zhang and Sekar [53] suffer from similar
drawbacks as SecondWrite, in that their handling of
indirect control flow and memory accesses also inflates
5 http://llvm.org/
6 Note that this feature has nothing to do with enforc-
ing control flow integrity. It only relates to ensuring that
the application behaves the same before and after rewriting,
whether that is as intended by the developer or not.
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the executable size even before any actual code hard-
ening has been applied.
In many scenarios, that inflation is not problem-
atic. All post-link-time rewriter developers target and
evaluate desktop computers and applications [40,45,3,
53,50], where code size and file size are not really con-
cerns. Furthermore, with desktop operating systems, all
rewritten code can simply be reallocated contiguously
in a completely different range of the address space.
Smart cards, however, typically feature very small
memories and often lack virtual memory. As a result,
smart card software developers cannot rely on any of
the existing post-link-time rewriter implementations.
That does not imply, however, that post-link-time
rewriting approaches are fundamentally infeasible. By
including more advanced binary code analysis steps like
the ones referenced near the end of Section 2.2, and
by ensuring that only relatively standard, clean binary
code is generated for an application, a post-link-time
rewriter should be able to correctly relocate all data
and code, thus avoiding the overhead of the current
approach of SecondWrite and the other tools. The gen-
eration of such clean binary code, i.e., code with rec-
ognizable control flow transfer patterns, can most often
be realized by imposing coding guidelines and by con-
trolling the compiler options. In some cases however, it
might be more tricky, e.g. where it concerns system li-
braries that mix C code and inline assembly fragments.
As the same reasoning can be applied to link-time
rewriters, the post-link-time approaches are ultimately
as hampered as link-time solutions with regards to their
potentially imprecise modeling of indirect control flow.
So fundamentally, the main difference between tools
like SecondWrite on the one hand and tools like Diablo
on the other hand, is the abstraction level at which code
is represented and transformed. Regarding the harden-
ing of code against fault-injections, it is an open ques-
tion whether operating at a compiler IR level instead
of at an assembly IR level offers real benefits.
3 Implemented Sample Protection Schemes
For this study, we implemented four first-line-of-defense
cookbook protections that provide local hardening against
single-instruction failure attacks [37]. To understand
the value of these schemes and the rationale behind
some implementation choices and practical issues, it is
important to consider the attack model in which these
protections are considered.
3.1 Attack Model
By means of oﬄine hardware and software hacking in
labs, attackers reverse-engineer the complete software
installed on a smart card, incl. its (often deterministic)
timing. This enables them to engineer fault-injection
attacks to steal secret data, e.g., using hacked termi-
nals at restaurants or ATMs, and to counterfeit credit
cards. To deploy the attacks covertly, the fault-injection
infrastructure and the data acquisition hardware need
to fit into small devices that are, with respect to out-
side appearance and observable timing behavior, not
distinguishable from standard terminals by a layman.
An important form of fault-injection attacks in such
scenarios are single-cycle faults. Knowing the software,
the attacker selects an instruction to disrupt. Knowing
the software timing, he then determines the cycle in
which to inject a fault, e.g., by temporarily lowering
the supply voltage or by flashing the instruction fetch
bus with a laser. Which exact bits will flip because of
the injected fault is typically not under control of the
attacker, however.
By causing random bit flips on a chosen branch in-
struction, an attacker has a good chance of turning it
into an operation that does not transfer control, but in-
stead falls through to the next instruction. This follows
from the fact that most instructions (i.e., most instruc-
tion encoding bit combinations) fall through. Similarly,
an injected fault can turn a memory store into a non-
store with high probability. And an instruction that sets
a condition flag can likely be converted into one that
does not set the flag. By contrast, with random bit flips
an attacker has no real hope of turning an arithmetic
logic unit (ALU) instruction into a control flow trans-
fer to a chosen address, or into a store operation at a
chosen memory location. This severely limits the likely
successful attacks he can mount.
Besides failing to perform its intended task, a faulted
instruction will of course still have some unpredictable
effect on the processor state, such as overwriting a reg-
ister value. But each possible effect has a relatively
low probability. Furthermore, there is a relatively low
chance that the effect of the faulted instruction will
completely corrupt the continuing execution of the pro-
gram. For example, if a branch instruction is faulted, it
is not unlikely that the only result will be an overwrit-
ten register whose value is no longer used in the pro-
gram. From the attacker’s perspective, a faulted con-
trol flow transfer, memory operation or condition flag
setting operation will hence quite likely behave like a
simple no-op instruction.
In summary, we envision attackers will try to iden-
tify a branch, call, return, compare, or store instruction
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that, when turned into a no-op, causes sensitive data to
be leaked or unauthorized tasks to be performed. The
first goal of the hardening protections is therefore to
rewrite the code such that replacing single instructions
by a no-op no longer causes unwanted behavior.
The existing protections for which we implemented
support in our prototype rewriter achieve this for cer-
tain classes of code fragments. We certainly do not want
to claim that we present new protection schemes, or
that our prototype can offer full protection. We only
implemented a number of basic protections to demon-
strate that the automation of these types of protections
in a link-time rewriter is feasible and comes with an ac-
ceptable overhead.
Nonetheless, we want to argue that even the applica-
tion of only the implemented protections can be useful
in certain scenarios. In particular, the implemented pro-
tections can contribute in lowering the likelihood of a
successful attack to the point where an attacker’s costs
(e.g., the hacked terminals, the oﬄine analysis inves-
tigation, bribing people to cooperate, ...) outweigh his
likely benefits. That is the reason why rather simple
forms of redundancy are a typical first line of defense
in the first place [37].
More recently, multiple fault injection attacks have
also become viable [47]. The protections presented in
here do not necessarily protect against those.
3.2 Implemented Protections
We implemented redundancy-based protection schemes
in a tool on top of the Diablo framework. We targeted
the ARM Cortex-M0 instruction set architecture (ISA)
of the ARM SecurCore SC000 processors [52], which
are aimed at future smart card applications. In these
schemes, the protected program executes some invalid
state exception code when a fault is detected. In our
prototype, we opted for implementing that invalid state
exception code by means of simple infinite loops, which
at least prevent that any secret data is outputted follow-
ing a fault injection. Given Diablo’s existing support to
inject user-provided code into a program [16], this loop
can easily be replaced by other invalid state handling
code that is, e.g., selected not to leak information via
timing side channels, but otherwise continue the normal
execution of the program.
We again want to emphasize that the implemented
protections are not meant to demonstrate full protec-
tion or stronger protection than what can be achieved
manually today. They were instead chosen because they
(1) are being used in practice, (2) allow us to pinpoint
technical and usability issues, and (3) allow us to eval-
ldr r0,[r1]
cmp r0,#5
beq .Lsafe
.Lsens:
<sensitive code>
.Lsafe:
<safe code>
(a) Original code
ldr r0,[r1]
cmp r0,#5
beq .Lsafe
ldr r0,[r1] // duplicated
cmp r0,#5 // duplicated
bne .Lsens // duplicated
.Lfault:
<invalid state exception>
.Lsens:
<sensitive code>
.Lsafe:
<safe code>
(b) Protected code
Fig. 1 Example of conditional branch duplication
uate the feasibility and overhead of automated, link-
time hardening transformations compared to manual
or compiler-based hardening.
3.2.1 Conditional Branch Duplication
Sensitive code paths are often shielded by checks that
verify whether a correct password was entered, the cor-
rect key was used, a valid request was performed, etc.
On smart card processors like the ARM SecurCore
SC000, these checks correspond to conditional branches
in the binary code. The branches are taken or not taken
depending on flags in a flags register, which can either
be set explicitly by a comparison instruction or implic-
itly according to the result of an ALU operation. At-
tacks can focus on the input values used to perform the
operation that sets the flags, on that operation itself,
or on the conditional branch that depends on the flag.
To protect against attacks that make the checks in-
effective by skipping one of those instructions, we du-
plicate the computation of the flags and the conditional
branch. A typical scenario targeted by this transforma-
tion is depicted in Figure 1(a)7. In this case, we want
to prevent that an attacker can force the conditional
branch to fall through by either skipping the branch
itself, or by skipping one of its immediately preceding
instructions. In the original code, and in a fault-free op-
eration, the conditional branch beq falls through to the
sensitive code if and only if the value loaded from ad-
dress r1 into register r0 by the ldr instruction is not
7 A brief overview of ARM & Thumb architecture is given
in the electronic appendix to this article
Link-time Smart Card Code Hardening 7
ldr r0,[r0]
cmp r0,#5
beq .Lsafe
.Lsens:
<sensitive code>
.Lsafe:
<safe code>
(a) Original code
ldr r2,[r0]
cmp r2,#5
beq .Lsafe
ldr r0,[r0] // duplicated
cmp r0,#5 // duplicated
bne .Lsens // duplicated
.Lfault:
<invalid state exception>
.Lsens:
<sensitive code>
.Lsafe:
<safe code>
(b) Protected code when register r2 is free
push r2 // potentially avoidable spill
ldr r2,[r0]
cmp r2,#5
pop r2 // potentially avoidable spill
beq .Lsafe
ldr r0,[r0] // duplicated
cmp r0,#5 // duplicated
bne .Lsens // duplicated
.Lfault:
<invalid state exception>
.Lsens:
<sensitive code>
.Lsafe:
<safe code>
(c) Protected code when no free register is available
Fig. 2 Conditional branch duplication that needs additional
temporary registers or stack space.
equal to 5. If the load operation (ldr) is skipped by
a fault injection, however, the compare will be based
on an older value of register r0. In that case, the con-
ditional branch may fall through to the sensitive code
even when the value at address r1 in memory was 5,
thus potentially leaking sensitive data. In case the com-
pare operation cmp is skipped by a fault injection, the
conditional branch will fall through or jump based on
the condition flags already set before the ldr instruc-
tion. So again, the branch might fall through even when
the value at address r1 in memory was 5.
The code is therefore transformed into the code of
Figure 1(b). In this code, skipping a single instruction
will never allow the attacker to reach the sensitive code
when the value at location r1 in memory is equal to
5: If any of the first three instructions are skipped,
the duplicated load and compare instructions will effec-
lsl r0,r1
cmp r0,#5
beq .Lsafe
.Lsens:
<sensitive code>
.Lsafe:
<safe code>
(a) Original code
mov r2,r0 // unavoidable data copying
lsl r0,r1
cmp r0,#5
beq .Lsafe
lsl r2,r1 // duplicated
cmp r2,#5 // duplicated
bne .Lsens // duplicated
.Lfault:
<invalid state exception>
.Lsens:
<sensitive code>
.Lsafe:
<safe code>
(b) Protected code when register r2 is free
push r0 // unavoidable data copying (stack)
lsl r0,r1
cmp r0,#5
pop r0 // potentially avoidable spill
beq .Lsafe
lsl r0,r1 // duplicated
cmp r0,#5 // duplicated
bne .Lsens // duplicated
.Lfault:
<invalid state exception>
.Lsens:
<sensitive code>
.Lsafe:
<safe code>
(c) Protected code when no free register is available,
but where r0 is dead on entry to the safe code.
Fig. 3 Another conditional branch duplication that needs
additional temporary registers or stack space
tively make the branch-if-not-equal instruction bne fall
through into the invalid state exception code. By skip-
ping one of the duplicated instructions, the only thing
the attacker can achieve is that the conditional branch
falls through instead of being taken. So again, the at-
tacker cannot force the sensitive code to be reached.
More complex variations of the code in Figure 1(a)
can occur. First, there can be multiple definitions of the
input value(s) of the comparison in different predeces-
sors of the comparison’s basic block. The duplication
of the definitions can then be skipped, which weakens
the protection because of reduced redundancy. Alterna-
tively, the multiple definitions can be duplicated, pos-
sibly by means of tail duplication [38], even before the
actual redundancy is being inserted. So far, our proto-
type only supports the former.
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Secondly, it does not always suffice to merely dupli-
cate instructions. Consider the case when an instruc-
tion’s destination operand register is also one of its
source operands, as in the ldr r0, [r0] instruction in
Figure 2(a). The problem is that the instruction over-
writes the value of its own source operand, which is
hence no longer available for the duplicated instruc-
tion. In such cases, we need to find one or more free
(i.e., dead) registers to rename registers before perform-
ing the duplication, or to store copies of the original
source operand values temporarily. Our prototype finds
such free registers by means of a state-of-the-art bidirec-
tional context-sensitive interprocedural liveness analy-
sis [18]. When free registers are found, we can simply
use them, as shown in Figure 2(b). When no free reg-
isters are found, they are created by either renaming
registers locally, or by inserting the necessary spill code
instructions that temporarily save values on the stack,
as with the push and pop instructions in Figure 2(c).
Please note that in this example, register r2 can be
used directly because in the Thumb ISA, ldr’s desti-
nation operand is not also an implicit source operand.
For other instructions, however, including most ALU
operations, the destination operand is also an implicit
source operand. This is because Thumb’s instruction
width of 16 bits is too narrow to encode three differ-
ent register operands in all instructions. When such in-
structions with an implicit source operand need to be
duplicated, an additional copy operation needs to be
inserted to duplicate the operand’s original value be-
fore it is overwritten. Figure 3(b) shows an example
of such an additional mov instruction, which cannot be
avoided. Sometimes, depending on the liveness of the
involved registers, this copy operation can be fused into
the spilling code. An example is shown in Figure 3(c),
where the value in r0 is copied to the stack by the push
instruction.
Apart from spilling registers to free them, it can also
be necessary to spill the flag register when the flags are
consumed by instructions computing the flag for the
conditional branch. Spilling the flag register itself by
means of msr and mrs instructions adds additional over-
head, as might the freeing of normal registers to spill the
flag register to. This is illustrated in Figure 4. This code
example also illustrates that setting condition flags in
Thumb is not limited to simple compare instructions.
Instead, almost all Thumb instructions (sometimes op-
tionally) set the flags. This further complicates finding
the transformation with the lowest overhead.
On the ARM Cortex-M0’s with its Thumb ISA,
sometimes a form of “light” spilling can be used to
avoid the power-consuming memory operations of tra-
ditional spilling. In this ISA, only the lower registers
sbcs r3,r0 ; subtract with carry,
set Z flag if result is zero
beq .Lsuccess
<failure handling code>
.Lsuccess:
<sensitive code>
(a) Original code
push r3,r4 ; free r3 and r4
mrs r4,cpsr ; temporarily save carry flag in r4
sbcs r3,r0
beq .Ldup1
add sp, #8 ; abandon saved r3 and r4
<failure handling code>
.Ldup1:
msr cpsr, r4 ; restore saved carry flag
pop r4,r3 ; restores r3 and r4
sbcs r3,r0
beq .Lsuccess
<invalid state exception>
.Lsuccess:
<sensitive code>
(b) Protected code
Fig. 4 Conditional branch duplication with additional over-
head for duplicating condition flags
r0–r7 are generally accessible as source and destination
operands in all instructions. Registers r8–r12 are acces-
sible through fewer instructions, incl. moves and com-
pare instructions without immediate operands. When
the registers r8–r12 or r14 (which holds the return ad-
dress) are dead at some program point, they can serve
as spill locations for lower registers that need to be freed
to duplicate operations.
While the above examples are by themselves pretty
straightforward, they illustrate that finding the code
with the least overhead involves many conditions to be
checked. It is hence clear that manual application of
the protections, e.g., on assembly code is cumbersome
and time consuming, even if only local spilling options
are considered. So on the one hand, automation, e.g.,
through binary code rewriting, is highly welcome. On
the other hand, it is also clear that when the auto-
matically computed liveness information lacks precision
to find the needed free registers, significant additional
overhead might be introduced.
In Section 4, we will estimate that additional over-
head. For that estimation, we will count the following
instructions as unavoidable overhead of the hardening
of conditional branches:
– the duplicated instructions that implement the hard-
ening;
– mov instructions inserted as in Figure 3(b) to copy
source values that are unavoidably overwritten by
an operation to be duplicated because that opera-
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tion’s destination operand is also an implicit source
operand;
– push instructions that are fused with such mov in-
structions, and that hence implement not only spill-
ing, but also the necessary copying;
– msr and mrs operations needed to duplicate condi-
tion flags because an instruction that both consumes
and overwrites them is to be duplicated as part of
the hardening.
These encompass all instructions that are unavoidable
given the limitations of the Thumb ISA and the re-
quested code duplication to implement the hardening.
By contrast, we will count all other inserted spill
operations and all other move operations as potentially
avoidable overhead. The reasoning is that some of these
spills and moves might have been avoided with more
accurate liveness information or through more global
register reallocation or more advanced transformations
than are currently supported by our tool. In other words,
these spills and moves might have been avoided during
manual hardening of assembly code or when the hard-
ening was done by a compiler in the yet-to-be-allocated
compiler IR of the code.
Our estimate of the potentially avoidable overhead
will certainly overestimate the truly avoidable overhead.8
As such, our bookkeeping allows us to put an upper
bound on the extra overhead potentially caused by the
link-time rewriter’s immaturity or by its lack of analy-
sis precision and global register allocation. In Section 4,
this will ultimately allow us to demonstrate the feasi-
bility of link-time smart card code hardening.
Our tool, being just a prototype, only targets the
most easily attacked types of code fragments, i.e., the
low-hanging fruit of attackers. Most importantly, our
implementation currently assumes that the fall-through
path following a conditional branch is the sensitive one.
This follows from the insight that it is much simpler for
an attacker to skip a branch that had to be taken under
fault-free conditions, than it is to force taking a branch
that would not be taken under fault-free conditions. If
sensitive code lies on the branch-taken path, the branch
has to be inverted first, or an additional inverted check
has to be inserted on the fall-through path as well. Our
current prototype does not yet support this. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we discuss how a programmer can inform a
link-time tool about the exact program points to be
considered sensitive and on the policies that should be
applied at each of them.
8 The truly avoidable overhead can only be determined
precisely by developing a hardening compiler or by apply-
ing all protections manually, for which we lack the time and
resources.
Furthermore, our prototype branch duplication skips
conditional branches at loop exit points [38], because
loops are often better protected with other transforma-
tions such as the one discussed in Section 3.2.4.
In addition, our duplication of instructions is cur-
rently limited to the following two instruction patterns,
for which we duplicate 3 and 2 instruction respectively:
pattern 1: 1) any instruction producing rX
2) cmp/tst rX, #immediate
3) conditional branch
pattern 2: 1) any instruction setting the flags
with operands rX, rY or
rX, #immediate
2) conditional branch
We opted for these patterns because they make up over
95% of all conditional branches in our tested bench-
marks and because they cover both simple and complex
scenarios as discussed above. Implementing support for
more patterns and for duplicating more instructions
would involve a significant effort without significantly
changing the outcome of our experiments in Section 4.
3.2.2 Call Graph Integrity
Security analyses performed on a program’s call graph
are only as trustworthy as the guarantee that only mod-
eled calls or returns can occur. By injecting bogus call
or return addresses into the execution of a program,
it is possible to invalidate any call graph constructed
statically.
The call graph integrity transformation we imple-
mented works at a local level: at each individual call
and return site a value is set that can be checked at
the intended destination. At the start of every function
and at every return site, it is then possible to verify that
control indeed came from one of the allowed source lo-
cations. This in effect prevents calls and returns from
being skipped. This is less strong than existing protec-
tions that verify entire call chains, but on the plus side
it can be easily applied to call graphs that contain hard
to analyze constructs such as recursion.
Since our transformation is applied at link time,
supporting indirect function calls through function point-
ers or polymorphic method invocations requires extra
care. Lacking type information, link-time rewriters typ-
ically cannot determine the exact targets of an indirect
call. This is solved by clustering all functions that can
be called indirectly according to the symbol and relo-
cation information in the object files and treating them
as a single function as far as this transformation is con-
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Caller:
...
mov r4,#eb
blx CalledFunction
...
Callee:
cmp r4,#eb
beq .Lsuccess
<invalid state exception>
...
.Lsuccess:
<sensitive code>
Fig. 5 Passing and checking an ID
str r0,[r1]
ldr r2,[r1]
cmp r0, r2
beq .Lok
<invalid state exception>
.Lok:
...
strb r0,[r1]
ldrb r2,[r1]
eors r2,r0
lsls r2,#24 // sets or resets flag
beq .Lok
<invalid state exception>
.Lok:
...
Fig. 6 Two examples of a store followed by its verification
cerned. While this makes the protection less tight, it al-
lows us to deal statically with uncertainties introduced
by dynamic program behavior.
Figure 5 shows how each check consists of two parts.
Before every call a register or global variable is set to a
unique call identifier of the callee or cluster of callees.
In the example, the identifier has the value 0xeb. Next,
instructions inserted in each function’s prologue verify
whether the set value matches its identifier. Similarly,
before every return instruction a register or global vari-
able is set to a different return identifier. This value is
checked at the return points in the callers.
The hardening process starts by partitioning the
program’s functions into clusters whose members can
call each other indirectly, that can be called from the
same indirect call site, or that are linked through inter-
procedural gotos [15,17].
Next, the registers free on entry and exit in all func-
tions in a cluster are collected. If some register is always
free on entry, it will be used to pass the value from the
caller to the callee; otherwise the value is passed via a
global variable. A similar decision is made for the exit,
independently of what was decided at the entry. The
registers used to pass identifiers can obviously differ
across clusters.
Diablo also records whether the condition flags are
free on entry/exit of a cluster’s functions. Their avail-
ability is important because the checks involve compar-
ison instructions that overwrite them. While no ARM
ABI guarantees that the flags maintain their value across
function boundaries, functions written in assembly do
not always adhere to conventions. So whenever they are
not provably dead at some call or return point, they are
temporarily stored in a free register, which is created
through register spilling when necessary. In a large set
of programs we examined, only the ABI-defined func-
tions for emulating floating-point comparisons on sys-
tems lacking floating-point hardware return their result
via the condition flags.
For evaluating the efficiency with which this harden-
ing technique can be applied automatically at link time,
we consider all mov instructions that set the identifier
values as well as all compare and conditional branch
instructions that check that value and jump to infinite
loops, as unavoidable. All other inserted instructions,
such as spills and msr and mrs instruction, are counted
as potentially avoidable overhead.
3.2.3 Memory Store Verification
The failure of a store operation at run time generally
means that program state is lost. This can be addressed
by checking that the correct value was written to mem-
ory. Such a check also introduces some resiliency to
memory errors.9 The proper execution of a store can
be verified by loading the stored value back from mem-
ory and by comparing it to the value that should have
been stored, as depicted in Figure 6. This transforma-
tion requires an extra free register (r2 in the example)
to reload the stored value. Spilling might be needed to
create such a register. When a 16-bit halfword or a byte
are being stored as in the example at the bottom of Fig-
ure 6, some additional instructions are needed because
the reloaded halfword or byte cannot be compared di-
rectly against the 32-bit word out of which the halfword
or byte was stored.
Additionally, we have to ensure that the inserted
comparison does not overwrite any condition flags live
after the store to be protected. To keep all live flags’
values, we can simply save all of them temporarily, as
was done for the conditional branch duplication in Fig-
ure 4. Alternatively, we can often insert an instruction
that recomputes the live flags after the store instruc-
tion, thus freeing the flag at the point of the store. Fig-
9 The presented verification technique aims to ensure that
write operations take place as intended. For protecting the
values once they are stored in memory, complementary tech-
niques such as error-correction codes can be used [23].
Link-time Smart Card Code Hardening 11
sub r0, #1 // sets the condition flag
str r0, [r1]
beq .Llabel // based on subtraction result
(a) Original code
sub r0,#1 // sets the condition flag
str r0, [r1]
ldr r2, [r1]
cmp r0, r2
beq .Lcorrect
<invalid state exception>
.Lcorrect
cmp r0, #0 // recomputes the Zero flag
beq .Llabel
(b) Protected code
Fig. 7 Example of memory store verification with flag recom-
putation
ure 7 depicts an example, in which the combination of
msr and mrs (and the potentially necessary spilling to
find a register for them to use) are avoided by inserting
a simple compare operation that recomputes the Zero
flag. Furthermore, it can also be useful to reschedule
the existing code, such that more free registers become
available right after the store to be protected.
For evaluating the avoidable overhead of this hard-
ening technique applied automatically at link time, we
count the load, the comparison (or alternatively the
exclusive or and the shift), and the conditional branch
as unavoidable. All other operations are considered po-
tentially avoidable, including spills and msr and mrs in-
structions or their alternative comparison to recompute
flags. We count msr, mrs or their replacement as po-
tentially avoidable because the store instructions to be
protected can often be moved to points in the schedule
where no condition flags are live, and hence where no
flag saving and restoring instructions are needed at all.
So if our prototype tool does insert those instructions, it
might be doing so unnecessarily, because it lacks more
aggressive code motion support or because it lacks pre-
cise enough liveness information.
For hardening instructions that store to the stack
outside of function prologues and epilogues, we will
count the inserted spill instructions as potentially, but
unlikely avoidable. The reason is that most stores to
the stack in the original program result from register
pressure. So for most of the stores to the stack, the
presence of the store itself indicates that even in the
original, unhardened code, the compiler could not find
enough free registers. So for most of such stores to the
stack, spill code inserted to free a register will in fact
be unavoidable. A tiny fraction of the stores to the
stack are present, however, independently of register
pressure, i.e, because their stored values escape their
stack frame or because it concerns accesses to structs.
As we have no method to differentiate 100% accurately
between the two cases, we cannot accurately count the
number of unavoidable spills inserted to protect stores
to the stack. But we can estimate them, and hence we
report them as potentially, but unlikely avoidable.
3.2.4 Loop Iteration Counter Duplication
Many applications are sensitive to the number of itera-
tions executed in their loops. For example, running too
many iterations of a loop exporting a buffer might result
in sensitive data stored after the buffer being exported,
and running too few rounds of an encryption algorithm
might leak information about a secret key. Therefore we
need to protect loops such that they execute precisely
the foreseen number of iterations. We implemented a
loop iteration counter duplication to achieve this. Its
protection on the simple loop of Figure 8(a) is depicted
in Figure 8(b).
For this protection, the initial loop counter value
(r1 in Figure 8) is duplicated (into r5) in the loop’s
preheader. In the loop body, the loop counter operation
(sub) needs to be duplicated. Moreover, both directions
following the conditional branch at the exit of the loop
need to be protected to ensure that not too few and
not too many iterations are executed. That is why two
checks have been inserted in the code of Figure 8(b).
In our current prototype implementation, we pro-
tect natural loops of which the fault-free number of it-
erations can be determined before the loop is entered.
This requires that the loop contains a counter that is
updated exactly once per iteration and that the loop
exit is controlled by comparing the loop counter to a
loop invariant value. This excludes, e.g., loops that it-
erate over dynamic data structures such as linked lists.
For such loops, more generic loop control protection
can be implemented by means of the already presented
protections. Furthermore, our prototype does not yet
support function calls in loop bodies.
For this loop hardening technique, it is more com-
plex to estimate which of the inserted instructions are
unavoidable, and which ones might constitute avoidable
overhead because they stem from a lack of precise live-
ness analysis information and from our tool’s inability
to perform global register allocation. The reason is that
in this case, the liveness ranges corresponding to the
duplicated instructions span whole loop bodies, which
are much larger code regions than those involved in the
other hardening techniques.
For this protection we hence first estimate whether
or not a loop’s original code already suffers from register
pressure. The idea is that when the original loop body
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.Lpreheader:
mov r2, r0
.Lbody:
lsl r2, #1
sub r1, #1
cmp r1, #0
bg .Lbody
.Lafter:
...
(a) Original loop code
.Lpreheader:
mov r2, r0
mov r5, r1
.Lbody:
lsl r2, #1
sub r1, #1
sub r5, #1
cmp r1, #0
bg .Lcheck2
.Lcheck1:
cmp r5, #0
ble .Lafter
<invalid state exception>
.Lcheck2:
cmp r5, #0
bg .Lbody
<invalid state exception>
.Lafter:
...
(b) Protected loop code
Fig. 8 Example of loop iteration counter duplication
indicates that the original compiler or the assembly pro-
grammer were not able to allocate all used values to
the best suited registers, we can assume that a security
researcher protecting code manually will not be able
to allocate the duplicated counter to the best suited
registers either. In that case, it is impossible to avoid
operations that store and load the duplicated counter
to and from the stack before and after the duplicated
update and compare instructions. Hence we should not
consider such spilling operations a potential result of
our tool’s limitations.
For the original loop counter, which needs to be up-
dated in the loop body, the best suited registers are r0–
r7. In case the loop invariant value to which the loop
counter is compared for exiting the loop, is not an im-
mediate operand, the best suited registers to hold that
invariant value are r0–r12 and r14, because all of them
can be accessed by compare instructions. When we de-
tect that any loop invariant value of the loop or the
original loop counter itself are not allocated to those
best suited registers, we consider the original loop as
being generated under register pressure. Any spill or
“light” spill operations of the duplicated counter are
then unavoidable. In case an original loop body does
not show an unambiguous sign of register pressure, we
consider all spill operations and “light” spills as poten-
tially avoidable overhead.
This accounting method over-conservatively
estimates that for any original loop without the above
signs of register pressure, the rewritten loop (operating
on the same values plus a duplicated counter) would
not experience register pressure either. This is of course
not always the case. This method therefore incorrectly
counts some unavoidable spills as potentially avoidable.
In other words, like the accounting method of the other
transformations, this accounting method also overesti-
mates the real overhead resulting from our tool’s limi-
tations.
3.3 Specifying Where to Apply Protections
Just as source-to-source tools suffer from the difficulty
to specify security policies in terms of lower-level code
properties, the previous sections might have given the
impression that binary rewriting tools suffer from a sim-
ilar problem in terms of higher-level source code con-
structs and statements. It is therefore important to note
that the policy specification does not need to be limited
to the binary code or assembly code abstraction levels.
With a more complete tool than our prototype, pro-
grammers would be able to annotate their source code
to specify program points at which certain policies have
to be applied. They would then be able, e.g., to specify
which paths following conditional branches are sensi-
tive (see Section 3.2.1). This can easily be supported
by means of source code annotations in the form of
pragmas and attributes similar to the ones already sup-
ported by many compilers today. Consider the func-
tion f() in Figure 9 that is annotated with the exist-
ing noinline attribute to tell the GCC compiler not
to inline that function [38], and in which the condi-
tional branch is annotated with the unlikely built-in
macro that informs the GCC compiler to optimize the
code under the assumption that the branch is likely not
taken [38]. Very similar annotations like protect taken
or protect call graph integrity could be inserted
to inform a link-time rewriting tool about the code frag-
ments and paths to be protected. Such annotations pro-
vide a relatively convenient way for the programmer to
specify his security policy, without him having to insert
any protection manually.
To make this work, a precompiler tool will extract
and omit the annotations from the source code and
store them for later use in terms of source line numbers.
The existing compiler can compile the source code into
binary code that is annotated with standard debug in-
formation that maps addresses in the binary code to
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__attribute__((noinline)) void f(int x) {
if (unlikely(x==0)) clean_buffer();
else output_buffer();
}
Fig. 9 GCC source annotations
source code line numbers. On the basis of that infor-
mation, the link-time rewriter would then apply the
specified and extracted policies. At the time of writing,
we have completed support for specifying policies for
full functions or files, and for selecting types of frag-
ments or paths to which to apply a policy. For exam-
ple, the conditional branches preceding loop exit edges
can be excluded from the conditional branch duplica-
tion of Section 3.2.1, because loops are typically better
protected with specific optimizations such as the loop
iteration counter protection of Section 3.2.4.
4 Experimental Evaluation
Because of confidentiality, real smart card software is
not publicly available. So instead we evaluated the cov-
erage and overhead of our protections on C benchmarks
from the embedded MiBench suite [22]. We compiled
and protected ten MiBench benchmarks (see Table 1)
for a semi-hosted simulation environment (QEMU 1.0 [9]).
We used them to verify correctness and to collect execu-
tion profiles in order to measure the dynamic protection
overhead, i.e., the overhead in terms of number of exe-
cuted instructions. In the results, we will refer to these
benchmark versions as s1–s10.
Whereas the crypto benchmarks s6–s8 in our bench-
mark suite implement functionality typical for smart
card software, the other benchmarks were chosen (ar-
bitrarily) to increase the sample set size of our experi-
ments. Some of those benchmarks rely heavily on pro-
cedure pointers and floating-point emulation, and some
benchmarks are IO-intensive. With respect to those as-
pects, they are not representative of typical smart card
software. We still include them in our experiments be-
cause they increase the sample set size for evaluating
the protections that are orthogonal to these aspects.
We used the ARM RVCT 4.1 compiler for ARM
Cortex-M0 platforms at optimization level -O2. This
compiler is a centerpiece of Keil10, a development tool
box that includes support for industrial smart card soft-
ware development. We manually checked the generated
code for the presence of the protections.
All binaries are linked statically, such that they in-
clude all needed RVCT 4.1 C library code. Via that
library, our benchmarks contain considerable a-mounts
10 http://www.keil.com/smartcards
Table 1 Benchmarks
short- code size
benchmark domain hand (bytes) # ins
basicmath small floating-point s1 19580 8266
bitcnts integer bitcounting s2 8204 3461
qsort large 3D point sorting s3 14824 6489
qsort small string sorting s4 8012 3506
susan image processing s5 32172 14569
aes crypto s6 37092 12724
sha crypto s7 7296 3105
bf crypto s8 7792 2469
cjpeg JPEG encoding s9 54564 23088
djpeg JPEG decoding s10 61304 26673
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Fig. 10 Coverage results for conditional branch duplication
and call graph integrity checking.
of hand-written assembly code, which is not atypical
for real smart card applications.
Whereas developers of real smart card applications
would apply protections to only their sensitive parts,
there is no notion of sensitivity in our benchmarks.
They only serve the purpose of estimating the over-
head of protections applied at link time, and of validat-
ing their correct application. Our tool hence applied the
protections to the whole programs.
4.1 Coverage
4.1.1 Conditional Branch Duplication
Figure 10(a) shows the fraction of all conditional branch-
es (excl. loop exits) that were duplicated with the trans-
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formation described in Section 3.2.1. The absolute num-
bers of duplicated conditional branches are given on the
X-axis. All coverage results are based on static counts.
From all conditional branches excl. loop control, a large
fraction of 96% is duplicated. Per benchmark, this varies
between 90% and 99%. As for the small fraction of
branches not duplicated, this was mainly the result of
not finding the flag-setting instruction in the branch’s
basic block, as required by the instruction patterns tar-
geted by our prototype.
From this we can conclude that even with our rel-
atively immature prototype, the vast majority of the
conditional branches can already be protected. More-
over, as we protected close to 7000 conditional branches
in our experiments, our sample set is large enough to
draw conclusions on expected overhead in Section 4.2.1.
4.1.2 Call Graph Integrity
For this protection, our prototype adds checks at all
procedure entry points, and at all return points fol-
lowing call sites. So the coverage is 100%. In all cases,
the cluster identifier is passed through a register. This
is possible because in ARM Thumb, register r8 is not
generally accessible and not callee-saved, and hence it
was not live at any procedure entry or exit point.
Figure 10(b) shows to what extent procedures are
clustered as discussed in Section 3.2.2. The total num-
ber of procedures per benchmark is given on the X-axis.
The vast majority of them (i.e., more than 80% for most
benchmarks) are not clustered. Those procedures get
unique identifiers, which provides strong protection.
In all benchmarks, we observed one non-singleton
cluster containing all procedures that can potentially
be called indirectly through procedure pointers11. Typ-
ically, this cluster contains 5–10 standard library pro-
cedures. In cjpeg (s9) and djpeg (s10), however, it con-
tains more than 30% of all procedures, which more-
over are not library code, but application code. For
each image format supported by the benchmark pro-
grams, a structure is initialized with procedure point-
ers to routines that handle the supported image for-
mats. This structure is then dereferenced throughout
the (de)coding process, in what basically constitutes C-
style polymorphic procedure calls. The resulting clus-
tering significantly reduces the provided level of protec-
tion, as all of these functions now share the same two
identifiers: one for their entries and one for their exits.
11 In our link-time rewriter, the set of functions that can be
invoked through function calls is conservatively approximated
by computing the set of functions whose absolute address is
stored or can be computed somewhere in the program, as
indicated by the available relocation information.
Several observations have to be made here. First,
we consider this result not problematic for our case, as
we deem such heavy use of polymorphic procedure calls
not representative for real smart card applications. Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, even if this form of call
graph integrity would be applied and optimized manu-
ally, clusters would have to be formed when polymor-
phic procedure calls are present, albeit smaller clusters
than the ones now considered by Diablo. So some loss
in protection would be incurred anyway. In our future
work, we plan to study to what extent Diablo’s cur-
rent overly conservative clustering can be refined by
building on more advanced control flow analysis, e.g.,
through the use of a TSL [31].
For all benchmarks, we also observed several smaller
clusters of 2–8 manually-written system library proce-
dures that get clustered because of interprocedural go-
tos between them, e.g., where tail-call optimization was
used. This clustering also reduces the effectiveness of
the protection, but it can obviously be avoided by skip-
ping this type of code optimization.
4.1.3 Memory Store Verification
Our prototype tool was able to protect all of the 17222
individual store instructions in our ten benchmark pro-
grams. So again, the sample size is big enough to draw
conclusions on the protection’s overhead in Section 4.2.3.
4.1.4 Loop Iteration Counter Duplication
Our benchmarks contain a total of 224 natural loops
of which the iteration count can be determined be-
fore the loop is executed, and that contain no function
calls. 100% of those are protected. 115 are inner loops
in which no register pressure was detected (see Sec-
tion 3.2.4); 56 are inner loops with register pressure; 11
are non-inner loops without register pressure; 15 loops
are non-inner loops with register pressure. Here, “non-
inner” denotes a loop has at least one nested loop.
These numbers are obviously lower than the number
of branches or stores protected before, but they are still
sufficient to draw more general conclusions.
4.2 Overhead of the automation at link time
This section presents the measured overhead of apply-
ing the implemented hardening techniques at link time.
The overhead we are interested in is not the overhead
of the hardening techniques themselves, but the addi-
tional overhead of applying them in a link-time tool
that, compared to manual code hardening specialists
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or hardening compilers, may lack the necessary capa-
bilities and analysis precision to apply the hardening
techniques optimally with regard to code size or per-
formance overhead. In other words, we are interested
in the potentially avoidable overhead that our proto-
type has introduced.
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, computing the exact
additional overhead introduced by our tool compared
to an optimally applied protection is impossible with-
out implementing such an optimal protection, for which
we lack the time and resources. So instead we have
measured an upper bound on the overhead by care-
fully considering, for each hardening technique, which
inserted instructions form the unavoidable, inherent im-
plementation of the hardening protection, and which in-
serted instructions might have been avoided in case of a
manual or compiler-based application of the hardening,
or that might have been avoided with a more mature
tool than our prototype. How we distinguish the cat-
egories of inserted instructions was discussed in detail
in Section 3 for each of the hardening techniques. As
the processors used in smart cards are simple in-order
processors, counting dynamic instruction counts (with
QEMU) is an acceptable approximation of the real ex-
ecution time overhead.
Figures 11, 12, 14, and 15 present the results of these
measurements by means of profiling. For each harden-
ing technique, the charts present the total overhead of
its application at all program points where it could be
applied. Furthermore, the charts show how much of the
overhead is potentially avoidable.
Overall, the visualized overheads are pretty large,
but we should remind the reader that we blindly ap-
plied the protections to the whole benchmarks. In real-
ity, smart card developers will likely limit their appli-
cation to the sensitive parts of their applications.
4.2.1 Conditional Branch Duplication
From Figure 11, it is clear that most of the branches are
protected without any overhead beyond the protection
itself. Potentially avoidable overhead is at worst 0.48%
for performance, and 0.60% for code size inflation.
4.2.2 Call Graph Integrity
For call graph integrity checking, we observe in Fig-
ure 12 that the potentially avoidable overhead is much
higher in terms of performance overhead and in terms
of code size. The reasons for this overhead differ from
benchmark to benchmark.
For basicmath small (s1), the reason is the bench-
mark’s floating-point (FP) nature. All FP operations
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Fig. 11 Relative instruction count increases for conditional
branch duplication.
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Fig. 12 Relative instruction count increases for call graph
integrity checking.
in the source code are compiled to invocations of hand-
written FP emulation procedures. Each of them hence
has a large number of calling contexts, as a result of
which no free registers are found on entry/exit of these
functions. So a spilling overhead needs to be paid at
all their call-sites, which is unrealistically counted as
avoidable. This explains why a large fraction of the
static overhead is reported as avoidable. As these func-
tions are executed very frequently, this also explains the
large dynamic overhead that is, unrealistically, counted
as avoidable. Obviously, in real smart card code, such
FP-emulation can be expected to be quite rare. Fur-
thermore, this result in fact demonstrates that when
protecting complex, optimized hand-written assembly
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code, large overheads are generally unavoidable in prac-
tice regardless of the technique used.
For bitcnts (s2), qsort large (s3), qsort small (s4),
bf (s8), cjpeg (s9), and djpeg (s10), a large part of the
total dynamic overhead is also counted as avoidable. In
all cases, the overhead is due to the use of procedure
pointers. We group all procedures that are potentially
invoked through a procedure pointer into one cluster
of which it is conservatively assumed that all argument
registers (r0–r3), callee-saved registers (r4–r7), and all
return value registers (r0–r3) are live on entry and/or
exit. Hence, there are no free, generally accessible regis-
ters to store the cluster identifiers for these procedures.
Consequently, the entry and exit identifiers passed into
and out of those procedures are passed via r8, which
cannot be accessed directly in most Thumb instruc-
tions. The resulting overhead is incurred every time an
indirect call is executed, but also whenever a direct call
to a procedure in this cluster is performed. We refer to
the latter as a “mixed” call.
Figure 13 shows that several benchmarks feature a
very high frequency of indirect and mixed calls, which
explains almost all of the potentially available dynamic
overhead. In bitcnts (s2), the indirect calls originate
from the benchmark’s main loop that invokes five dif-
ferent bitcounting implementations through a pointer.
These comprise almost 50% of all calls, with the other
50% consisting almost entirely of recursive calls within
those implementations. Those recursive calls are direct,
but mixed calls, so also they come with overhead. For
qsort large (s3) and qsort small (s4), two benchmarks
centered around the qsort procedure, the comparator
procedure is passed to qsort as a procedure pointer,
and then invoked for pairwise comparisons between el-
ements to be sorted. For bf (s8), the large number of
mixed calls in Figure 13 comes from invoking the fputc
procedure more than 300k times. This procedure ap-
pears in a procedure pointer list in the standard library,
so even though it is invoked directly in this benchmark,
a price has to be paid because it is clustered with other
procedures. Finally, for cjpeg (c9) and djpeg (c10), rel-
atively few procedure calls are executed, hence the low
total dynamic overhead of this protection. But of those
calls executed, a significant number are indirect, as ex-
plained in Section 4.1.2.
In real smart card applications, that mainly perform
cryptographic procedures like in the benchmarks s6–s7,
the prevalence of procedure pointers, indirect procedure
calls, and inner-loop invocations of putc will typically
be much lower. As can be seen for these benchmarks in
Figure 12, the potentially avoidable dynamic overhead
is then also much smaller.
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Fig. 13 Fraction of all executed procedure calls that are in-
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(i.e., a direct call to a procedure that can potentially also be
invoked indirectly).
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Fig. 14 Relative instruction count increases for memory store
duplication.
4.2.3 Memory Store Verification
For the hardening of stores to memory, Figure 14 also
depicts the fraction of the overhead that is potentially,
but unlikely avoidable, as explained in Section 3.2.3.
We clearly observe that almost all overhead is inher-
ent to the protection: For 8 out of 10 benchmarks, the
potentially avoidable overhead is less than 0.15%.
Only for the qsort small (s4) and djpeg (s10) bench-
marks, our accounting method of Section 3.2.3 consid-
ers a relatively large fraction of the overhead as po-
tentially avoidable. But even in these cases, the poten-
tially avoidable dynamic overhead is limited to at most
2.07%. We manually investigated these cases and ob-
served that in qsort small, the overhead is introduced
in the qsort procedure itself, where it is indeed avoid-
able. However, because of the indirect call to the com-
pare method and our tool’s (overly) conservative han-
dling of indirect calls as potentially reentrant, our tool
could not avoid the overhead.
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In djpeg, the overhead relates to the protection of
two stores in the single inner loop of the procedure
h2v2 fancy upsample(). This loop has 6 variables that
are live over the whole loop and are allocated to 6 reg-
isters. Furthermore, the value to be stored by each of
the two store instructions also needs to occupy one reg-
ister. So in this loop, at most one register from r0 to
r7 can be available to reload the stored value into and
to compare the reloaded value to the stored value. In
this loop, however, the compiler has applied common
subexpression elimination (CSE) to avoid having to re-
compute a value in between the two stores. The value of
this common subexpression is stored in that one avail-
able register. As a result, our prototype does not find
a free register anymore. Instead it frees one by insert-
ing a push and a pop instruction, which are counted
as potentially avoidable. The only way in which a com-
piler implementing the hardening could have avoided
the need for such spilling, was by not applying the CSE.
But then the compiler would have to insert instructions
to recompute the value, which in this case also would
require two instructions. So in summary, the one free
register that is not strictly needed to implement the
original loop without spilling, can be used either for
optimizing the loop with CSE, or for implementing the
hardening without additional spilling overhead. Since
both options exclude each other, two extra instructions
are needed in the loop anyway. As such, the overhead
our accounting method considered as potentially avoid-
able for this benchmark, is in fact not avoidable at all.
We can therefore conclude that applying the mem-
ory store verification by means of a link-time rewriter
typically introduces very little avoidable overhead.
4.2.4 Loop Iteration Counter Duplication
Figure 15 first of all shows that our limited application
of loop counter duplication (excluding loops with proce-
dure calls) did not cover the hottest loops in all bench-
marks. In several benchmarks, however, the hottest, in-
ner loops were actually protected.
For only one, qsort small (s4), we observe a signifi-
cant, potentially avoidable performance overhead. But
even in that benchmark, the potentially avoidable over-
head is limited to 2.07%. In fact, this is the exact same
avoidable overhead as observed for qsort small for mem-
ory store verification, because it concerns the same in-
ner loop in the qsort procedure around which a register
needs to be freed for both types of protections.12
12 In qsort large, this loop (which swaps a pair of elements
in the array to be sorted) is also present, as it is linked from
the standard C library. But in qsort large, that loop is not hot
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Fig. 15 Relative instruction count increase for the loop iter-
ation counter duplication.
Because this protection is only applied to a lim-
ited number of loops, unlike the protection of very fre-
quently occurring conditional branches or store opera-
tions, the static avoidable overhead is also very small,
at most 0.38%. So again, we can conclude that overall,
applying the protection at link time does not introduce
significant avoidable overhead.
4.2.5 Combined transformations
To some extent, all of the implemented protections fight
for the same free registers. This is particularly the case
in loops, where the live ranges of the duplicated itera-
tors can overlap with the live ranges of temporary reg-
isters needed to implement the other protections. On
the other hand, a freed register can potentially be used
for multiple of those other protections.
The light bars in Figure 16 show the summed over-
head of all the protections applied in isolation, i.e., the
accumulated overheads of figures 11, 12, 14, and 15. The
dark bars on top show the additional overhead when
applying all protections together, in the following or-
der: iteration counter duplication, conditional branch
duplication, memory store verification, and call graph
integrity checking. On average, the dynamic overhead
of the combined protections is 0.76% higher than the
sums of the individual overheads. The maximal differ-
ence is 2.24%. For the static overhead, the average dif-
ference is 2.29%, and the maximal difference is 3.74%.
These low numbers demonstrate that developers can
experiment with our tool’s individual protections first,
e.g., to find the appropriate trade-off between level of
because the elements to be swapped are very small, whereas
in qsort small the elements are quite long strings.
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Fig. 16 Additional overhead from combining all protections.
protection and overhead. They can then combine them
afterwards, without having to fear that combining them
will lead to significantly different trade-offs.
4.3 Assistance for semi-automated protection
In the preceding evaluation we have demonstrated that
the vast majority of our automated link-time applica-
tions of protection policies introduces no or very little
avoidable overhead. But we have also observed that in
a limited number of cases, there is a significant amount
of avoidable overhead. Even in those cases, a tool like
ours can still be very useful to aid the developer with
manually protecting the code. For example, for the pro-
tected inner loop of the h2v2 fancy upsample() proce-
dure discussed in Section 4.2.3, our tool and the open-
source tool dot
(http://www.graphviz.org/) can produce the annotated
CFG depicted in Figure 17. It shows the inserted code,
indicating which parts are potentially avoidable and
which parts are not, as well as the computed liveness in-
formation and the execution counts determined through
profiling. Such pictures are the perfect starting point for
a developer to study whether the potentially avoidable
overhead can indeed be avoided, and if so, how.
5 Related Work
As cited in the introduction, many protection schemes
have been proposed to mitigate fault injection attacks.
In this paper, we focused on an automated approach
bbl in h2v2_fancy_upsample, #exec 64512
LIVE-IN: R0-R5, R10-R12, SP, RA, PC
   LDRB       r6,[r4,#0]
   ADD        r4,#1
   LSL        r7,r6,#1
   ADD        r6,r7
   LDRB       r7,[r3,#0]
   ADD        r3,#1
   ADD        r6,r7
   LSL        r7,r1,#1
   ADD        r7,r1,r7
   ADD        r5,r7,r5
   ADD        r5,#8
   ASR        r5,r5,#4
   PUSH       {r3}                            potentially avoidable
   STRB       r5,[r0,#0]
   LDRB       r3,[r0,#0]                                 unavoidable
   EOR        r3,r5                                         unavoidable
   LSL        r3,r3,#24                                   unavoidable
   BEQ        0xffffff98                                  unavoidable
LIVE-OUT:  R0-R2, R4, R6-R7, R10-R12, SP, RA, PC
bbl in h2v2_fancy_upsample, #exec 64512
LIVE-IN: R0-R2R2, R4, R6-R7, R10-R12, SP, RA, PC
   ADD        r5,r7,r6
   ADD        r5,#7
   ADD        r0,#1
   ASR        r5,r5,#4
   STRB       r5,[r0,#0]
   LDRB       r3,[r0,#0]                                  unavoidable
   EOR        r3,r5                                          unavoidable
   LSL        r3,r3,#24                                    unavoidable
   BEQ        0xffffffd0                                    unavoidable
LIVE-OUT: R0-R2, R4, R6, R10-R12, SP, RA, PC

invalid state exception bbl
   B          0xfffffffc         unavoidable
bbl in h2v2_fancy_upsample, #exec 64512
LIVE-IN: R0-R2, R4, R6, R10-R12, SP, RA, PC
   ADD        r0,#1
   MOV        r5,r1
   MOV        r1,r6
   SUB        r2,#1
   POP        {r3}                   potentially avoidable
   BNE        0xffffffd0
LIVE-OUT: R0-R5, R10-R12, SP, RA, PC

bbl at 0xf048


bbl in h2v2_fancy_upsample, #exec 512
LIVE-IN: R0-R1, R3-R5, R10-R12, SP, RA, PC
   LDR        r2,[r13,#0x1c]
   ADD        r0,#1
   LDR        r2,[r2,#0x28]
   SUB        r2,#2
   BEQ        0x2c
LIVE-OUT:  R0-R5, R10-R12, SP, RA, PC


bbl at 0xf002

Fig. 17 Fragment of a CFG produced by our tool, annotated
with execution counts and liveness information. The original
instructions of the program are shown on a light gray back-
ground. The instructions highlighted in yellow and marked
as “unavoidable” constitute the inherent implementation of
memory store protection. The instructions highlighted in red
and marked as “potentially unavoidable” constitute the ad-
ditional overhead of the protection, which might have been
avoidable if, e.g., the protections would be implemented by a
compiler instead of a link-time rewriter.
to deploy existing protections on native code. By de-
ploying the techniques in a link-time rewriter, we avoid
the need to interfere with the operation of existing com-
pilers or with an application’s source code development.
While the deployment of simple protections at link time,
by duplicating code like we do here, was already pre-
sented in an earlier publication [35], this paper is the
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first to evaluate the additional (i.e., potentially avoid-
able) overhead caused by their link-time deployment,
and to include more global protections such as the loop
iteration counter protection.
As discussed in Section 2, other existing static rewrit-
ing techniques cause too much overhead when applied
to smart card code. However, run-time rather than static
approaches have also been proposed to achieve similar
advantages in the context of bytecode execution on Java
smart cards. Lackner et al. proposed to adapt the vir-
tual machine (VM) that interprets the bytecode to in-
ject the necessary redundancy in the executed code [27,
28]. By duplicating code at run time, they achieve the
same goal of providing protection without interfering
with the software development cycle. Additionally, they
proposed hardware extensions that the VM can exploit
to reduce the overhead of the protections to near zero.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
On the basis of demonstrated capabilities of the Di-
ablo link-time rewriting framework, we argued for its
capabilities in development scenarios centered around
black-box, third-party compiler tool flows.
Using Diablo, we implemented a prototype tool that
automates protection against single fault injection at-
tacks. On code generated with industrial-strength, pro-
prietary compilers, we measured an upper bound of the
additional overhead that such an automated tool intro-
duces on top of the inherent overhead of the protections.
We observed that the overhead potentially caused by
the nature of our approach and tool, both in terms of
code size and of execution time, is very limited. There-
fore we are convinced that a link-time rewriter can ap-
ply the protections (almost) as well as a manual as-
sembler rewriter can, or as a compiler can. We can
therefore conclude that automated, link-time, single-
fault-injection protection is a realistic, promising direc-
tion, which can provide a significant step forward to-
wards more productive smart card programming and
code hardening.
Future R&D includes better mechanisms to select
where to apply the transformations, including possibili-
ties for steering the protection process through an inter-
active, GUI-based binary code hardening tool. In addi-
tion, we plan to research how to specify transformations
without having to hard-code them in a tool, but by in-
stead using convenient APIs like those of existing code
instrumentation tools [16]. Finally, it would be useful
to study whether our approach would incur more over-
head when applying protection schemes against multi-
ple fault injection attacks. In case those schemes need
more free registers, the overhead of applying them at
link-time might well be higher than what was demon-
strated with our current single fault protection. Fur-
thermore, we expect that it will be more difficult to
distinguish between inherent overhead of those schemes,
and additional overhead following from our approach.
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